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Sanctions ought to be effective .... We would like to see those 
sanctions applied by those who can make them effective. The 
countries which have economic power in South Africa must take the 
lead....
- President Joaquim Chissno,
Mozambique, 1980
However, if our call for their imposition is to be heeded, we 
have seriously to consider being directly involved. Those of us 
who can should impose sanctions of our own.
- President Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia 1987
If we have to conduct an armed struggle over an extended period 
of time the economy will be destroyed in a physical sense... The 
imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions... is the most 
effective way to ensure the non-destruction of that economy.... 
It is not that we want sanctions so that our people can be out of 
work [but] so that apartheid can end... We are ready to make any 
sacrifice... to see this system ended... we will do all the 
things we can and must do for our own freedom, but sanctions are 
additional and sanctions alone would not bring about any results. 
We have to be involved in the two pressures from inside and from 
outside.
- Publicity and Information Secretary 
Thabo Mbeki/President Oliver Tambo,
ANC, 1986
A Do It Yourself Guide For Whom
Joseph Hanlon and Roger Omond have written The Sanctions Handbook (Penguin, 399 
pages, £4.95, London, 1987) for those potentially or actually interested in 
arguing the case for sanctions and in pressing for/participating in their 
construction. They do so with copious material - much of it familiar to 
experts but greatly adding to the understanding of anyone else. Their style is 
direct and while committed, relative non-emotional. The more ground-breaking 
second half of the volume by Joe Hanlon is, as he described his idea before it 
became a volume, a how-to guide - "You too can build a sanction".
2This objective determines the main target audience - Western Europe and North 
America. The readership needing to be convinced that sanctions are justified, 
have black South African backing, can work and could be made to operate without 
crippling their own economies is primarily an Anglo-American (the countries not 
the company!) one with the EEC countries and Japan its outriders. For them the 
approach, the tone, the language English) and the major paperback publisher
with global distribution are fully appropriate.
The objective and main intended readership influence the emphasis - especially 
in the second half on "how to". Southern Africa ("South Africa's Dependent 
Neighbours") appear in the first half to show the negative impact of South 
Africa's regional strategy on them and their support for sanctions as a means 
of ending that cost. In the second half Southern Africa, the Front Line States 
and SADCC appear in passing as potential secondary actors in the imposition of 
sanctions with a warning (to the Western reader) that they have limited 
capacity to act and an admonition (to the same audience) that SADCC's 
dependence reduction priorities are the route to making sanctions practical
without self-immolation and should, therefore, have the full backing of
sanctions advocates.
The rest of Africa - slightly surprisingly given the negative psychological 
impact of OAU member's with a free choice entering into economic relations with 
South Africa - does not really appear nor do the Eastern European countries and 
China. For tactical and practical reasons this is probably quite justified - 
the book and its readers are unlikely to alter policies in these cases; their 
trade with South Africa is peripheral; their political stance against apartheid 
guarantees their not becoming serious bolthole providers as sanctions by North 
American and Western European states plus Japan and Australasia grow.
The Case For Action
The case for sanctions - including that they do historically have an impact - 
is set out cogently and with a wealth of detail. It is perhaps less forcefully 
put than in Richard Moorsom's The Scope for Sanctions: Economic Measures
Against South Africa (Catholic Institute for International Relations/British 
Council of Churches, London 1987) but also more encyclopaedically with more 
quotations from supporters. The breadth of black support in South Africa is 
demonstrated first - and has become even firmer since with COSATU, after
3detailed s£udy of the costs to its members, reaffirming its support for 
sanctions as essential to a speedy change of system.
The absence of significant white South African support is also made clear. 
Even Frederick van Zyl Slabbert and Helen Suzman (who with Joe Slovo of the 
ANC appear after the predictable big five - Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu, Tutu and 
Boesak - in surveys of black South Africans' opinions as to acceptable national 
political leadership members) are anti-sanction although, intriguingly, both 
accept the value of threatened (as opposed to imposed) sanctions in forcing 
change. Whether the July 1987 South African white advocates of systemic 
change/ANC talks in West Africa will alter this is not clear.
The analysis of sanctions' serious potential impact on the South African 
economy is well done. No rosy dream world of instant collapse is posited - 
rather slow grinding down process analogous to what happened to Rhodesia is set 
out after (as in Rhodesia) a possible brief import substitution spurt.
Three issues are problematic. The first is the degree of stress needed to 
cause a surrender of power. Sanctions against apartheid - as opposed to 
sanctions against continued occupation of Namibia or destructive engagement 
against Southern Africa - do not seek policy changes or even in any meaningful 
sense power sharing, but rather the transfer of power from the Afrikaaner 
establishment to the Liberation Movement (realistically defined as the ANC, the 
UDF, Cosatu and their allies). That is not the context in which sanctions have 
usually been used. The Rhodesian parallel is not a good one - the Lancaster 
House agreement (which did indeed result in a transfer of power) was possibly 
only because ZANU, ZAPU and Smithorewa all
expected to win the election. The apartheid leadership can hardly be expected 
to operate under any similar illusion.
The second question posed, but only in passing is; "If Rhodesia survived so 
long because South Africa was its economic conduit and lifeline, who will be 
South Africa's South Africa?". South Africa has no larger, more economically 
advanced neighbour nor is any really large economy likely to wish to appear to 
be its economic and military protector. (Even Isreal appears to be 
recalculating costs and benefits and is really too small while South Africa's 
tenuous military alliance with the USA is indirect via Jonas Savimbi and cannot 
be made direct barring very unlikely changes in US public and congressional 
perceptions.
4The third problematic issue is whether the main emphasis of sanctions should be 
- as argued - on export blocking. Realistically (as the authors half admit) 
gold cannot be blocked (albeit diamonds can) so that funds for the most crucial 
imports - though not for preserving white amenities or overall growth - will be 
to hand. On the other hand armaments, duel purpose goods (e.g. virtually all 
vehicles, vessels, aircraft, computers and communications equipment), high 
technology (low and medium RSA can produce or copy itself), finance (for major 
investment) and petroleum are a finite list of key imports whose cutting by 
even 50% would precipitate a downward economic and military capacity spiral.
And Some Priority Means And Modalities
In the second half of the volume Joe Hanlon underlines that sanctions do exist 
on a rapidly growing and fairly broad basis even if still full of holes and 
short on enforcement. The whole tenor of the Northern debate and of 
politicians' response to it has changed dramatically even since 1985. This is 
to no small extent the result of steady education efforts by often small 
liberation support groups and of their - largely symbolic - do it yourself 
boycotts and disinvestments (or disvestitures). But their very success - and 
the much more visible and effective role now played by independent Southern 
African states and by the South African Liberation Movement - make a review of 
the situation, of strategic targets and of ways forward timely. Small group 
boycotts and similar exercises remain important. They have substantial 
publicity and educational value in the North; they are acts of solidarity which 
may be of psychological assistance to those suffering under or from apartheid; 
they can continue to spearhead drives for action by the big economic 
battalions, i.e. states and TNCs. But they need to be seen in that context and 
selected with a view to getting the big battalions on the move on the specific 
fronts on which South Africa is most vulnerable.
The most novel and valuable part of the book is the taxonomy - in the second 
half of the text and a "Directory of Sanctions" - about types of sanctions by 
coverage, purpose strengths and limitations and prospects. "Universal 
compulsory sanctions" is a valuable rallying cry and an unimpeachable goal. 
However, the reality of actual progress is and will remain the accumulation of 
specific sanctions by particular countries or groups of countries. Further 
some sanctions matter much more than others. Therefore, given limited
5political capital and still more limited policing capacity, sanctions advocates 
should prioritise their attention to these.
From both a military and an economic point of view the key ones are:
a. military equipment and technology (mandatory, compulsory but riddled with
leaks at least the larger of which could be plugged);
b. dual purpose equipment (especially all vehicles, planes and helicopters,
ships computers and sophisticated communications equipment - an area now 
largely uncovered but to a substantial degree practicable as OECD state 
restrictions on transfers to the USSR, China and their allies 
demonstrate);
c. high technology - whether embodied in machinery or in designs, blueprints
and knowledge on production and use - needed in particular in the
manufacturing and energy sectors (as with "b" now largely not covered but
practicable so far as hardware and major corporation knowledge transfers 
are concerned);
d. new financial flows (now largely halted for economic reasons but needing 
more general legislative bans to insure against any recovery);
e. petroleum (a relatively leaky embargo net now greatly increases costs, an 
effective surveillance and publicity apparatus could cause serious 
operational problems to RSA).
Two more readily practicable (indeed on largely existing and one building up) 
sanctions - against sport/entertainment contact and air communications - are 
important primarily psychologically. Sports, entertainment and overseas travel 
matter to South African whites and their denial brings home the sense of being
outcasts. Thus their effect on morale can be much more than trivial.
To a degree corporate disinvestment/withdrawal (the great direct success of 
North American and, to a lesser degree, British, Dutch and Nordic activists) is 
also important to increase the sense of isolation and to undermine morale. But 
it has two other practical results; first, it cuts down technology transfers 
and capacity to expand dual purpose and military production; second, it erodes 
the vested interest lobby in the North for South Africa and against sanctions.
6The authors see gold sanctions as an addition, but their scenario of gold
dumping by central banks seems likely to be a piece of wishful thinking.
Diamonds, however, are much more practicable than they suppose. The Central 
Selling Organisation (safely based in London) could operate as profitably as 
now on non-South African stones - a solution agreeable to its proprietors as 
good capitalists and to all other producers. As diamonds can be identified as 
to mine of origin (unlike remelted gold) and the floating stock of uncut stones 
is small, such a policy could be forced on the CSO.
General RSA export sanctions can - as already seen where sanctions are in force 
- work. South Africa’s economic problems (and the hassle factor with visibly 
RSA products) are already having that effect, e.g. 1987 UK imports from RSA are 
likely to be barely £600 m versus nearly £1000 m in 1985 and a 1982-86 average 
of £780 m. More boycotts and more sanctions - building on existing partial 
measures, e.g. in the USA and EEC - can help those trends along.
Southern Africa - What Is To Be Done?
The Sanctions Handbook does set out the situation and positions of the 
independent Southern African states lucidly and fairly - even if as a secondary 
topic. Namibia is not treated separately but as an integral part of South 
Africa which is legally absurd and temporally probably wrong, but as far as 
tactics for achieveing sanctions go is perhaps a just permissible form of
reductionism.
For Southern Africa the primary problem is not sanctions against apartheid 
(South Africa) but apartheid's (South Africa's) sanctions against them.
Because the FLS and SADCC see no end to these South African sanctions until
apartheid is ended the logic of their support for global sanctions against 
South Africa is very much like that of the ANC and COSATU. Better - to 
paraphrase SADCC Ministerial Chairman Peter Mmusi - to endure the pains of a 
woman in childbirth and bring a new life into the world than be hit over the 
head indefinitely by a thug with a sjambok.
The nature and magnitude of the price Pretoria exacts from its neighbours is 
set out albeit sketchily. The 1987 SADCC Summit figure of 1986 direct costs of 
$2 billion (presumably $1.25 to 1.4 billion excess military costs, $.3 to .4
7billion exqess transport costs and lost transport earnings, $.3 to .6 billion 
directly military damage) and the UNICEF (Children On The Front Line) detailed 
estimate that 1986 regional GDP was of the order of $6 billion lower than it 
would have been in the absence of 1980-86 South African destabilisation and 
aggression make the point more forcibly at macro level. At sectoral and 
overall social level, Hanlon (Beggar Your Neighbours), CIIR/Curry, Londonl986), 
David Martin and Phyllis Johnson (Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at 
War, Zimbabwe Publishing, Harare, 1986) and UNICEF (especially in the grim 
estimation of the 500,000 direct and indirect infant and under-five war 
inflicted deaths) over 1980-86 are much more cogent. And at the human level 
the voices of Southern Africans, e.g. speaking to reporters after the July mass 
murder of nearly 400 souls (including pregnant women, nursing mothers, babies 
at the breast and unborn infants) at Homoine near Inhambane by South Africa’s 
armed bandits (Independent, 25 July 1987) on what mass terrorism is and, e.g. 
of Namibian women in the occupied territory speaking to Caroline Allison (Its 
Like Holding The Key To Your Own Jail, World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1985 
about day-to-day and year-to-year life under military occupation are the most 
eloquent. The Mozambican video on terrorism in their country ("Killing The 
Dream") and the SWAPO film on the Kassinga massacre ("Remember Kassinga") are 
arguably even more effective, but unless and until they can be placed on at 
least educational and "fourth channel" (special interest) TV in the North will 
be seen by very few of those whom sanctions advocates need to convince.
Omond and Hanlon also set out the contradiction confronting Southern Africa. 
To be convincing in saying sanctions are needed most Southern African states 
see a need to act more than symbolically themselves. But to do so without 
self-immolation - except for Angola and Tanzania who do operate complete or 99% 
complete sanctions now - requires reducing dependence on South Africa. South 
Africa uses destabilisation and armed aggression to maintain that dependence 
partly because its hopes to use Southern Africa as a hostage against sanction 
in the same way it is trying to use its own black workers.
Arguably - albeit Omond and Hanlon do not touch on the issue - FLS strategy and 
tactics on sanctions to be imposed by themselves have not been adequately 
articulated and planned on a sequential basis. In 1986 the Commonwealth, EEC 
and USA debates forced Zambia and Zimbabwe to take a lead on arguing for and 
committing themselves to sanctions. Whether they could have avoided implying 
1986 or early 1987 implementation and indeed tied implementation to global 
action to allow them to restore and safeguard Mozambican and Angolan transport
8routes deserves reappraisal because the latter option remains open. Certainly 
the apparent - in many Western and some African eyes - backsliding and the 
collapse of a premature attempt to cobble together a package of air transport 
sanctions have not helped Southern Africa's external prestige or influence, 
nor, more important, the struggle for effective Northern sanctions against 
apartheid.
The crucial point - which Hanlon makes briefly - is that for the SADCC members 
to impose sanctions and resist South African reprisals on top of present
regional war levels, they must be enabled to carry out SADCC's core dependence 
reduction (on South Africa) programme in transport and energy and the FLS must 
be made able to safeguard these routes, other key economic units and the lives 
of its peoples.
The cost is not impossibly high - especially set against $2 billion annual 
direct war bill and $6 billion annual output loss and up to 200,000 lives
snuffed out annually directly or as a consequence of South Africa's destructive 
engagement with the region. Over three years it might be about $6 billion ($2 
billion key SADCC priority transport and certain additional energy programmes, 
$1.5 billion additional security costs, $1.5 billion to re-employ migrant 
workers expelled by South Africa and provide an airlift to Lesotho). By the 
end of that time annual gains and cost savings should be running at $1 billion 
a year and rising while annual costs should fall.
That programme should be presented as part of any serious global sanctions 
against apartheid package and "sold" internationally as such. If that is done, 
the FLS can indeed afford to impose sanctions. Indeed once the first chunks of 
the programme - upgrading of the Beira and Dar corridors to 3 million tonnes
dry and 1 million tonnes petroleum each per year plus reopening the Nacala and
either the Chicualacuala/Maputo or Lobito corridors - which are now financially 
in hand and in the first three cases physically under way are complete, and 
proven defence cordons set up around them, the FLS can (and presumably will 
feel they should) move ahead unitedly on sanctions. Until then risking a South 
African transport blockade for a token sanction would - especially for Botswana 
- be courting martyrdom for no probable gain to the liberation of South Africa.
The key themes of this argument are - as noted - presented by Hanlon. To any 
Southern African they will seem to be presented too briefly and without enough 
stress on the need to make economic liberation and effective security of the
9Southern African region an integral part of sanctions against apartheid. That 
message can be communicated. While more liberation supporters in the North
should be voicing it, the prime duty for formulating and expressing it more 
effectively rests with Southern Africans and the Front Line States' 
governments.
SSA Beyond The Front Line
In Omond and Hanlon Africa seems to begin at the northern frontiers of Angola, 
Zambia and Tanzania. The other OAU members and Morocco are not mentioned 
except for Nigeria (and the OAU itself) in passing. For present sanctions 
promotion this is tactically wise. But it is not the same for Africans, 
especially Southern Africans.
The OAU record on sanctions against South Africa is sound as are those of
several member states, e.g. Algeria, Nigeria, Burkina to cite a few. But
overall too many African states who do not need to have economic relations with 
South Africa have too many. Zaire's transport routings; Cape Verde's open (and 
others' semi-secret) landing right provision for Sud Afrikaans Lugdienst; 
Sierra Leone's massive concessional contracts with a South African/Israeli
joint venture - these do Africa's good name; the cause of South African 
liberation and the struggle for sanctions harm out of all proportion to their 
size or the cost of eliminating them.
Collective consultation and coordinated action are needed. For example 
Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola do need to arrange to make alternative 
transport routes available to Zaire (and the external friend of any or all to 
help finance them). A pooled buy-out of SAL's (SAA's) Cape Verde landing 
rights - which are perhaps $5 million a year but a very large proportion of 
Cape Verde's export earnings - is surely not impossible. But many other trade 
and other economic links could and should be broken unilaterally. They are 
crowed over in Pretoria and raise morale disproportionately to their size and 
are pounced upon by Africa's enemies and denigrates as evidence of lack of 
will, presence of hypocrisy or both. Only Africa - led by Southern African 
states as those most affected plus others with clean hands - can lance these 
boils on the body of the liberation struggle.
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Sanctions Strikes and Armed Struggle; Alternatives or Components?
One weakness of the book - an endemic one in sanctions promotion literature - 
is to present sanctions as an alternative to violence. It is more than a 
trifle late for that - any reader of Children On The Front Line will be aware 
that the annual lives lost as a result of apartheid are in the hundreds of 
thousands. Equally any reader of SWAPO and ANC documents will be aware that 
South African non-response (more accurately violent response) to non-violent 
protest and struggle has already forced the Liberation Movement to take up 
armed struggle as one of their tactics. Finally it is fairly clear that
sanctions against Rhodesia would not have forced Smithorewa to Lancaster House 
in 1979 (by 1989 perhaps) without the interlocking pressure from the military 
front spearheaded by ZANU(PF).
Sanctions are not an alternative to violence - violence exists now. Sanctions 
cannot prevent the loss of life - lives have been and are being lost by the 
scores and hundreds of thousands. Sanctions alone cannot bring a speedy end to 
apartheid - only together with strikes to dislocate the economy (and the white 
life style) and armed struggle (to raise costs - including lives - to the
beneficiaries of apartheid) can they contribute to negotiated handing over of
power to the Liberation Movement within a decade. Nor are sanctions a 
substitution of negotiation for war - they are one means to bring the existing 
war to a negotiated end sooner. (Even in its most pessimistic moments the ANC
does not envisage fighting step by step to Table Mountain as opposed to
negotiating a takeover of power at an earlier stage, the questions are how soon 
and what is negotiable.)
Sanctions can save lives by shortening the period of violence before a 
negotiated end to the war. They can give a liberated South Africa a better 
starting point - less physical damage, less bitterness (by all concerned) from 
lost lives (of the dead and of the living), more interim or permanent 
availability of white community skills and experience, more readiness (by all 
parties) to compromise on secondary issues including the pace of economic 
restructuring.
These facts should be posed more fully and frankly than Northern sanctions 
advocates usually do. The ANC, SWAPO and the FLS are quite clear - apartheid 
uses violence at home and abroad and is impervious to reason and protest.
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Therefore, force - including armed struggle as well as sanctions - must be used
to bring it to an end. Why should their supporters be less frank?
The argument that violence is hard to sell seems rather lame - even if it has 
an element of truth in it. The FLN in Algeria, Frelimo in Mozambique, MPLA in 
Angola, the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe mobilised external support and their 
use of violence to force negotiations for handing over power (independence) was 
accepted. Why are the ANC and SWAPO different?
In any case a selling of sanctions as non-violent is dangerous as well as
disingenuous. Because sanctions do grind down the economy they increase the
potential effectiveness of armed struggle and are thus logically parallelled by 
its selective intensification. A key example is half presented by Moorsom (The 
Scope for Sanctions: Economic Measures Against South Africa). Discussing
petroleum sanctions he cites unpublished estimates by the present author that
with inconvenience plus the cost of completing additional gas and sugar based 
synfuel capacity South Africa could - just - live with petroleum sanctions. He 
does not give equal stress to the author's other point: in that context of just 
getting by strikes by workers at or by the ANC on refineries, SASOLS, methanol 
units, storage tanks and pipelines could rapidly bring economic chaos or
seriously decrease the mobility of South Africa's very petroleum intensive
armed forces. Sanctions in this case are a means to enhancing the 
effectiveness of, not substituting for, non-violent internal struggle and armed 
struggle (targeted sabotage).
The basic case that sanctions can save lives and reduce deaths, shorten the war 
and lessen destruction remains valid. It is unwise to obfuscate it by a 
romantic or disingenuous implication that sanctions are an alternative to armed 
struggle in the context of an ongoing bloody war.
In Summation
In conclusion will hardly do - neither the struggle to entrench Southern 
African and achieve Namibian and South African liberation nor the rising role 
of sanctions in that struggle are concluded. This volume is a weapon in those 
struggles - no less serviceable because it is an intellectual one. Hanlon and 
Omond are to be commended for their work.
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The two main limitations noted - posing the Southern African front fully enough 
and the sanctions/armed struggle interaction squarely and lucidly - are real. 
But for present purposes of sanctions promotion in the North they are 
secondary. They do represent an unfinished agenda for explication and 
promulgation - first by SADCC, the FLS, SWAPO and the ANC and then by Northern 
Support Groups and individuals. (After all what is a Support Group for if it 
does not support and publicise the priorities and understandings of those it is 
created to support?) That work can complement this volume, but does not 
detract from the fact that in The Sanctions Handbook Hanlon and Omond have done 
the best job to date of publicising why and by what means sanctions should be 
imposed against, and to contribute to ending, apartheid.
- a luta continua 
vittoria e certe
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